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TOWARD AN EXPANDED VIEW OF THE DUE 
PROCESS CLAIM IN ENTRAPMENT CASES* 
Paul Marcust 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States has a very serious crime problem,1 indicated 
not only in terms of bare numbers but also in terms of the many 
individuals directly affected by crime.2 Significantly, crime has 
an adverse effect on the way we view ourselves and our society.3 
* This is the written version of a lecture given in February 1988 while the author 
was Distinguished Visiting Professor at the Georgia State University College of Law. 
t Professor of Law, University of Arizona College of Law; A.B. 1968, University of 
California. Los Angeles; J.D. 1971, University of California, Los Angeles. 
Jd. 
1. See FBI, 1987 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 163 (1988): 
Nationwide, law enforcement agencies made an estimated 12.7 million arrests 
in 1987 for all criminal infractions except traffic violations. When the arrest 
volume was related to the total United States population, the arrest rate 
was 5,330 per 100,000 inhabitants. In cities with populations of 250,000 or 
more, the rate was 7,808, the highest recorded .... Increases of 25 percent 
were shown for both total arrests and arrests for violent crimes in the 10-
year period, 1978-1987 .••• The 1987 drug abuse violation arrest total was 13 
percent above the 1986 figures and 38 percent higher than in 1983. 
2. See Davis, The Crime Victim's "Right" to a Criminal Prosecution: A Proposed 
Model Statute for the Govrmzance of Private Criminal Prosecutions, 38 DE PAUL L. REv. 
329 (1989). Summarizing calculations recently published by the Justice Department, 
Professor Davis states that "[o]ne out of every 133 Americans will be murdered," 83% 
"will be victims or intended victims of violent crimes at some point in their lives," and 
nearly 30% "will be the victim of a robbery or attempted robbery." Id. at 331-32. 
3. In the fall semester of 1988, the author was a visiting professor at the University 
of Geneva, Criminal Law Department, Geneva, Switzerland. During that time I observed 
a nation which has a virtually nonexistent violent 'crime rate. The impact of such a rate 
on the way people live is readily apparent. People are willing to walk in the evenings 
by themselves seemingly with no fear; they are not reluctant to send their teenage 
children out at night in unsupervised activities; public transportation thrives in the middle 
of all major cities at almost all times of the day; and though people at parties discuss 
many issues, violent crime is not one- of them. Moreover, the Swiss newspapers and 
television commentators give little time to discussion of criminal justice. See SOURCEBOOK 
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1987, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS 123 (1988) (survey shows 40% of U.S. citizens think the crime rate in their 
area is increasing, slightly more than 40% think it has remained the same, and less than 
20% think it is decreasing). 
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The crime problem in the United States is a very difficult one 
and will not go away quickly.4 Certainly, much needs to be done 
in the United States to combat crime. Our society needs to attack 
more vigorously both the underlying causes of crime and the 
way in which criminal activity is detected, investigated, charged, 
and resolved. Still, I strongly advocate a position which may 
appear to be naive regarding law enforcement needs vis-a-vis 
crime problems.5 My view is that in the name of combatting 
violent crime we have gone too far, or more precisely we have 
allowed law enforcement officials to go too far in detecting and 
investigating crime. We have reached the state of police 
involvement in crime that Judge Brown of the Fifth Circuit wrote 
of more than twenty-five years ago, where "enough is more than 
enough- it is just too much."6 Our justice system has allowed 
and encouraged law enforcement officials to instigate crime and 
at times create crime where crime would not have existed without 
government involvement. I propose a sharply expanded view of 
the way in which the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth 
amendments is applied so as to limit overinvolvement by law 
enforcement officials in crime.7 
I. THE TRADITIONAL DUE PROCESS DOCTRINE 
In several important areas an expansive view of the due 
process clause is not necessary, because other well established 
constitutional doctrines address claims regarding overinvolvement 
of the police. For instance, if law enforcement officers fail to give 
adequate warnings regarding the fifth amendment privilege 
4. For an excellent treatment of the causes of crime, as well as the impact throughout 
society, for both the United States and Switzerland, see Clinard, CUics With Little CriTIU? 
(ASA Rose Monograph 1978). 
5. For the similar views of some prominent judges, see infra text accompanying notes 
36, 40, and 47. 
6. Williamson v. United States, 311 F .2d 441, 445 (5th Cir. 1962) (Brown, J., concur-
ring). 
7. The commentators have been virtually unanimous in calling tor more aggressive 
application of the due process clause in this area. See, e.g., Abramson & Lindeman, 
Entrapment and Due Process in the Federal C()Urls, 8 AM. J. CRIM. L. 139 (1!180); Mascolo, 
Due Process, Fundamental Fairness, and Conduct That Shocks the Conscience: The Right 
Not to be Enticed or Induced to CriTIU? by Government aiul Its Agents, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. 
REv. 1 (1984); Comment, When Use of the Entrapment Defense is Barred; Is There a Viable 
A.lternative Defense?, 5 CooLEY L. REV. 203 (19!l8) [hereinafter Comment, EntrapTIU?nf 
Dt:_fense]; Comment, Entrapment, De Lorean and the Undercover Operation: A Constitutivna/ 
Connection, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 365 (1985); Comment, Entrapment and Dw: Proce.<s: 
How For is Too Far?, 58 TUL. L. REV. 1207 (1984). 
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against self-incrimination, under Miranda v. Arizona8 statements 
made by suspects in custody responding to interrogation will be 
inadmissible to prove guilt at trial.9 Similarly, under the fourth 
amendment search and seizure provision, evidence will be excluded 
if police officers failed to obtain a required warrant prior to 
searching or seizing.10 Even in the usual case involving application 
of entrapment law, the defendant will not be convicted if the 
police improperly instigated the crime.11 
Numerous cases of police overinvolvement remain, however, 
which are not so easily handled by looking to the standard attacks 
on the admission of evidence or on convictions. For instance, 
warnings under Miranda become somewhat irrelevant if the 
defendant has been deprived of adequate food and clothing for 
too long a period,12 has been cut off from others during 
interrogation, 13 or has been lied to regarding the charges against 
her.14 In such situations the United States Supreme Court has 
not hesitated to reverse the defendants' convictions by applying 
the due process clause rather than the fifth amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination.15 
8. 384 u.s. 436 (1~66). 
9. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). While statements obtained in violation of 
Miranda may not be used to prove the guilt of the defendant at trial, they may be used to 
impeach the defendant's in-court testimony. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). 
10. The seminal case in this area is Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which applied 
the fourth amendment to the states and established the exclusionary rule for evidence 
unlawfully obtained under the Constitution. But see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 
(1984), which put forth the so-called "good faith" exception to the rule of exclusion. Now 
evidence may be admitted if the police officers in reasonable good faith relied on a 
judicial warrant which later turned out to be invalid. Jd. at 913. 
11. The key issue in most entrapment prosecutions will be whether the defendants 
were predisposed to commit the crime. See Judge Learned Hand's statement in United 
States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir. 1952): .. [W]as the accused ready and willing 
without persuasion and was he awaiting any propitious opportunity to commit the 
offence['?]" 
12. See Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413 (1967) (petitioner's "confession," in which he 
implicated himself in a prison riot and which followed two weeks of detention in a tiny 
bare cell shared by two other inmates, during which time the petitioner was forced to 
remain naked and was fed only twelve ounces of soup and eight ounces of water per 
day, held involuntary as the result of coercion). 
13. Id. 
14. Lynumm v. Dlinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963). 
15. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936): 
The due process clause requires .. that state action, whether through one 
agency or another, shall be consistent with the fundamental principles of 
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political insti-
tutions." It would be difficult to conceive of methods more revolting to the 
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Similarly, in the fourth amendment setting, the Supreme Court 
has held that certain activities by law enforcement officials are 
so contrary to a civilized society that these activities will not be 
permitted under the due process clause. The most famous case 
in this area is Rochin v. California,16 in which law enforcement 
officers forced a suspect to undergo a stomach pumping procedure 
in a medical facility. Writing for the majority, Justice Felix 
Frankfurter found that such police conduct could not be tolerated 
as a matter of due process. He explained the basis for the Court's 
conclusion: 
Regard for the requirements of the Due Process Clause "in-
escapably imposes upon this Court an exercise of judgment 
upon the whole course of the proceedings [resulting in a 
conviction] in order to ascertain whether they offend those 
canons of decency and fairness which express the notion of 
justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged 
with the most heinous offenses." These standards of justice 
are not authoritatively formulated anywhere as though they 
were specifics. Due process of law is a summarized constitu-
tional guarantee of respect for those personal immunities 
which, as Mr. Justice Cardozo twice wrote for the Court, are 
"so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as 
to be ranked as fundamental," or are "implicit in the concept 
of ordered liberty ."17 
Entrapment issues are somewhat more problematic when 
examining police overinvolvement in crime. Most jurisdictions in 
the United States, including the federal system, have adopted an 
entrapment test which focuses on the defendant's state of mind 
prior to the commission of the crime.18 If the evidence shows 
that the defendant was "predisposed" to commit the crime, the 
entrapment defense will fail. In these jurisdictions,19 once the 
sense of justice than those taken to procure the confessions of these peti· 
tioners, and the use of the confessions thus obtained as the basis for 
conviction and sentence was a clear denial of due process. 
Id. at 286 (citation omitted). In Broum, the defendants confessed to murder following 
prolonged torture by state officials which included a partial hanging and severe whippings 
with a leather strap. Id. at 280-83. 
16. 342 u.s. 165 (1952). 
17. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. at 169 (citations omitted). 
18. As a result, this test is normally referred to as the "subjective test," which looks 
to the individual propensities of the defendant. For a discussion of the point, see P. 
MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE ch. 2 (1989). 
19. Approximately twelve jurisdictions use the so-called objective test which looks 
entirely to the government conduct to determine if such conduct was excessive. Id. at 
ch. 3. 
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entrapment defense fails because the defendant was predisposed, 
the question of government overinvolvement in crime then 
becomes one of constitutional dimension. Could another claim, 
under the due process clause, be successful in attacking 
government overinvolvement in crime?20 
II. THE BASIS FOR THE DUE PROCESS ATTACK 
The Supreme Court has never expressly held that a due 
process claim can be successful in cases where the entrapment 
defense fails. It is virtually beyond dispute, however, that a 
majority of the Justices- given the appropriate case-would so 
hold. The Court has referred to the due process claim in language 
which has persuaded virtually all state and federal judges dealing 
with the issue that such a constitutional claim exists. For instance, 
in United States v. Russell,21 Justice Rehnquist stated that "[w]hile 
we may some day be presented with a situation in which the 
conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due 
process principles would absolutely bar the government from 
invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction, the instant 
case is distinctly not of that breed."22 Justice Powell, in Hampton 
'V. United States,23 intimated that the due process claim could be 
accepted, though with difficulty: "I emphasize that the cases, if 
any, in which proof of predisposition is not dispositive will be 
20. The due process claim is different from the entrapment defense though both 
claims may arise in the same case. See, e.g., United States v. Graves, 556 F.2d 1319, 1322 
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978): "'[A]part from any question of predispo-
sition of a defendant to commit the offense in question, governmental participation may 
be so outrageous or fundamentally unfair as to deprive the defendant of due process of 
law ... .'" (quoting United States v. Quinn, 543 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1976)). 
Judge Brown explained the point clearly: "[The due process claim's] kinship to entrap-
ment is not that the act of a Government representative induced the commission of a 
crime. Rather, it is that the means used to 'make' the case are essentially revolting to 
an ordered society." Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441, 445 (Brown, J., concurring). 
21. 411 u.s. 423 (1973). 
22. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32 (citation omitted). In Russell, the 
defendant was convicted of unlawfully manufacturing the drug methamphetamine. The 
undercover agent investigating the defendant's activities had supplied the defendant with 
an essential ingredient used to manufacture the drug. Id. at 424-26. 
Along with Chief Justice Burger and Justice White, Justice Rehnquist apparently 
retreated from this view in Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976), where his 
plurality opinion concluded, in Justice Powell's words, that "no matter what the circum-
stances, neither due process principles nor our supervisory powers could support a bar 
to conviction in any case where the Government is able to prove predisposition." !d. at 
495 (Powell, J., concurring). 
23. 425 u.s. 484 (1976). 
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rare. Police overinvolvement in crime would have to reach a 
demonstrable level of outrageousness before it could bar 
conviction."24 Justice Brennan echoed these comments in Mathews 
v. United States,25 stating that "[s]ome governmental conduct 
might be sufficiently egregious to violate due process."26 
Today, looking to these statements, as well as to cases such 
as Rochin v. California,27 state and lower federal judges 
consistently write that a due process claim can be entertained if 
the government action is "so outrageous that it violates the 
concept of fundamental fairness inherent in due process and 
shocks the sense of universal justice mandated by the due process 
clause."28 Perhaps the best statement of the proposition was put 
forth by Judge Friendly: 
[T]here is certainly a limit to allowing governmental involve-
ment in crime. It would be unthinkable, for example, to permit 
government agents to instigate robberies and beatings merely 
to gather evidence to convict other members of a gang of 
hoodlums. Governmental "investigation" involving participa-
tion in activities that result in injury to the rights of its 
citizens is a course that courts should be extremely reluctant 
to sanction. Prosecutors and their agents naturally tend to 
assign great weight to the societal interest in apprehending 
and convicting criminals; the danger is that they will assign 
too little to the rights of citizens to be free from government-
induced criminality.29 
Few lawyers today challenge the existence of a due process 
claim regarding government overinvolvement in crime. What is 
truly amazing, however, is how few cases have arisen in which 
the due process challenge has been used to strike down a 
conviction. The leading case on point is United States v. Twigg,30 
in which the defendant was convicted of manufacturing and 
possessing narcotics with the intent to distribute.31 A government 
agent contacted the defendant, and encouraged him to set up a 
24. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. at 495 n.7. 
25. 108 S. Ct. 883 (1988). 
26. Mathews v. United States, 108 S. Ct. at 888 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation 
omitted). 
27. 342 u.s. 165 (1952). 
28. State v. Pleasant, 38 Wash. App. 78, 82, 684 P.2d 761, 764 (1984) (citing Hampton 
v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 493 (1976)). 
29. United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1973). 
30. 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978). 
31. United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d at 375. 
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"speed" laboratory.32 Ultimately, the defendant agreed and handled 
financing and distribution for the operation, but it was the 
government officer who obtained the equipment and materials 
necessary to produce the drug.33 During this period the 
government officer controlled the manufacturing process and the 
laboratory .=34 The court found that the government involvement 
in the creation of the crime in this case was "so overreaching as 
to bar prosecution of defendants as a matter of due process of 
law.":Js The court focused its attention on the fact that in this 
case-unlike other similar cases-the defendant was not shown 
to have been actively involved in the production or distribution 
of narcotics until after the government agent induced him to 
engage in such activities. The majority noted that: 
[T]he DEA agents deceptively implanted the criminal design 
in [the defendant's] mind. They set him up, encouraged him, 
provided the essential supplies and technical expertise, and 
when he . . . encountered difficulties in consummating the 
crime, they assisted in finding solutions. This egregious con-
duct on the part of government agents generated new crimes 
by the defendant merely for the sake of pressing criminal 
charges against him when, as far as the record reveals, he 
was lawfully and peacefully minding his own affairs. Funda-
mental fairness does not permit us to countenance such ac-
tions by law enforcement officials and prosecution for a crime 
so fomented by them will be barred.36 
United States v. Lard37 is another case where the government 
involvement was simply too extensive to be condoned. In Lard, 
state and federal agents attempted to buy illegal weapons and 
explosives from the defendant.38 The defendant initially refused 
to provide the weapons, but ultimately agreed after numerous 
requests by the government officials.39 The due process language 
of the court, once again, is striking: "[The agent's] conduct was 
not aimed at facilitating discovery or suppression of ongoing 
illicit dealings and unregistered firearms. Rather, it was aimed 
32. !d. 
33. Id. 
34. !d. 
35. !d. at 377. 
36. !d. at 381. 
37. 734 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1984). 
38. United States v. Lard, 734 F.2d at 1292. 
39. !d. 
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at creating new crimes for the sake of bringing criminal charges 
against Lard, who, before being induced was lawfully and 
peacefully minding his own affairs."40 
People v. Isaacson41 is another extreme case in which the due 
process clause was used to void a conviction. In this case, a police 
informant induced the defendant to commit a drug offense.42 The 
informant had previously been arrested by the New York State 
Police for possession of a controlled substance.43 During 
questioning following arrest, a police investigator struck the 
arrestee "with such force as to knock him out of a chair, then 
kicked him, resulting in a cutting of his mouth and forehead, and 
shortly thereafter threatened to shoot him."44 When the police 
lab report revealed the "controlled substance" to be nothing but 
caffeine, the police failed to inform the arrestee. Instead, the 
police used the threat of a lengthy prison term to induce the 
arrestee to assist in producing drug arrests.45 The informant then 
contacted the defendant and pleaded with him to make a cocaine 
sale, finally tricking the defendant, at police request, into crossing 
the state line to complete the sale.46 Dismissing the indictment, 
the New York Court of Appeals condemned the police conduct 
as "an incredible geographical shell game" which revealed "the 
ugliness of police brutality [and] ... a brazen and continuing 
pattern in disregard of fundamental rights."47 
III. THE APPLICATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 
Many courts express willingness to strike down convictions on 
due process grounds when police conduct is viewed as sufficiently 
outrageous. Cases actually voiding convictions, however, are very 
few in number, as courts have given the due process clause 
extremely limited application. For example, in United States v. 
Tobias,48 the due process claim failed even though a government 
undercover drug agent established an illegal drug laboratory for 
40. Id. at 1297. 
41. 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978). 
42. People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d at 514-18, 378 N.E.2d at 79-81, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 
715-17. 
43. Id. at 514, 378 N.E.2d at 79, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 715. 
44. Id. at 515, 378 N.E.2d at 79, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 715. 
45. Id., 378 N.E.2d at 79-80, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 715-16. 
46. Id. at 516-18, 378 N.E.2d at 80-81, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 716-17. 
47. Id. at 522-23, 378 N.E.2d at 84, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 720. 
48. 662 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. Unit B Nov. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1108 (1982). 
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the defendant, sent him the necessary chemicals for the lab, and 
on at least thirteen different occasions gave advice to the 
defendant as to the manufacturing process for the drug.49 Although 
the court concluded that the facts in the case "set the outer 
limits to which the government may go in the quest to ferret 
out and prosecute crimes,"50 the court affirmed the defendant's 
conviction. 
Even in cases in which the defendant has been "pretargeted" 
for investigation and prosecution by government agents,51 the 
due process clause is rarely invoked successfully. Indeed, the 
Fifth Circuit expressly overruled a case in which due process 
was held to be violated when such "pretargeting" had occurred. 
In United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco,52 the court refused to 
invalidate the conviction when it was shown that the informant 
would be compensated "based on the government's evaluation of 
his overall performance."53 Instead of utilizing a due process 
approach to such a predetermined investigation, the court found 
that the jury could "weigh the defendant's arguments about the 
inherent unreliability of 'purchased' testimony."54 
Numerous other cases demonstrate that judges are very 
reluctant to apply the due process analysis even in cases of 
extreme government involvement in crime.55 To be sure, the 
49. United States v. Tobias, 662 F.2d at 384. 
50. ld. at 387. 
51. ?retargeting refers to the situation in which a particular defendant is picked out 
for the undercover agent's or informant's efforts by the government. Often the undercover 
agent is not paid for her efforts unless the pretargeted defendant is arrested or convicted. 
&F' United States v. Lane, 693 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1982) (contingent fee arrangement 
with informant did not violate entrapment standards since informant did not implicate 
pretargeted defendants); Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441, 444 (5th Cir. 1962) 
lconviction based on informant's testimony reversed because government failed to justify 
or explain the contingent fee arrangement with informant). 
52. 826 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1987). 
53. United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d at 311. Although the informant 
testified that his fee did not depend on the ultimate conviction of the defendant, id. at 
:312, a dissenting judge insisted that the fee "depended upon the outcome of the case and 
the quality of (the informant's] testimony." Id. at 316 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
54. Id. at 316. Cerl)antes-Pa.-:heco overruled Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441 
(5th Cir. 1962), which had established the rule that an informant paid on a contingency 
fee basis is per se an incompetent witness. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d at 312. The court 
compared such an informant's testimony with testimony procured through a plea bargain. 
Id. at 315. As the dissent noted, however, recognizing that plea bargain arrangements 
increase incentives to give perjured testimony does not justify legitimizing yet another 
incentive to lie. ld. at 316 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
55. Undoubtedly, the most controversial cases in which the courts generally refused 
to apply the due process analysis were the so-called ABSCAM prosecutions. The FBI, in 
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United States Supreme Court has been perhaps the most reluctant 
court in the country to apply the due process clause in this area. 
The leading case is Hampton v. United States,56 in which the 
evidence showed, in dissenting Justice Brennan's view, that "the 
Government's agent deliberately set up the accused by supplying 
him with contraband and then bringing him to another agent as 
a potential purchaser ."57 Justice Brennan maintained that in this 
situation the "Government is doing nothing less than buying 
contraband from itself through an intermediary and jailing the 
intermediary ."56 Even in this extreme situation the majority of 
the Court found no difficulty in affirming the conviction. The 
Court rationalized that the government agents were acting in 
concert with the defendant and that the defendant was predisposed 
to commit the crime for which he was convicted: "If the police 
engage in illegal activity in concert with a defendant beyond the 
scope of their duties the remedy lies, not in freeing the equally 
culpable defendant, but in prosecuting the police under the 
applicable provisions of state or federal law."59 While Justices 
Powell and Blackmun were not willing to concur in Justice 
Rehnquist's statement that perhaps the due process clause could 
never apply in this area,60 the two concurring Justices concluded 
that the facts in this case did not bar conviction of the predisposed 
defendant as a matter of due process.61 
CONCLUSION 
I believe we have lost sight of the reasons for allowing 
substantial government involvement in the detection and 
a series of cases, offered bribes to government officials. Subsequently, some of the officials 
accepted the bribes and were then prosecuted for official corruption. In the leading case, 
United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982), the 
court en bane refused to find a due process violation because the behavior of the FBI 
agents did not rise to the necessary level of outrageousness. Id. at 609. The dissenting 
opinion of Judge Aldisert is a strong indictment of the government's position in connection 
with the ABSCAM cases: "Federal public policy, and, indeed, basic social policy, dictate 
that it is better to let a technical transgressor go free than to allow federal law 
enforcement officials to manufacture crime that entraps the unwary innocent." Id. at 615 
(Aldisert, J., dissenting). Interestingly, state judges have been considerably more receptive 
to the due process claims than federal judges. See, e.g., State v. Glosson, 462 So. 2d 1082 
(Fla. 1985); State v. Hohensee, 650 S.W.2d 268 (Mo. 1982); Commonwealth v. Matthews, 
347 Pa. Super. Ct. 320, 500 A.2d 853 (1985). 
56. 425 u.s. 484 (1976). 
57. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. at 498 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
58. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
59. Id. at 490. 
60. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
61. Jd. at 492-95 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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investigation of crime. Our justice system allows this activity in 
order to stop crime and to incarcerate criminals. Undoubtedly 
the process of detecting and investigating crime is a difficult one 
in which we should resist reversing convictions simply based on 
our feelings of being offended by "some fastidious squeamishness 
or private sentimentalism about combating crime too 
energetically."62 Still, to have judicial opinions which hold that 
the due process clause only forbids the government from entirely 
manufacturing crime is intolerable.63 More preferable, and more 
compatible with fundamental fairness is Justice Frankfurter's 
view that the courts of the United States must "accommodate 
the dangers of overzealous law enforcement and civilized methods 
adequate to counter the ingenuity of modern criminals."64 This 
means that the due process clause requires a close and very 
careful judicial scrutiny of intensive police involvement in crime. 
For example, the Supreme Court should have strongly condemned 
the conduct of the government officers in the Hampton case 
where the government essentially both sold the narcotics to the 
defendant and bought the narcotics back from him. I agree with 
Judge Hastie's view as stated twenty-five years ago in a virtually 
identical case: 
But when the government's own agent has set the accused 
up in illicit activity by supplying him with narcotics and then 
introducing him to another government agent as a prospective 
buyer, the role of government has passed the point of toler-
ation. Moreover, such conduct does not facilitate discovery or 
suppression of ongoing illicit traffic in drugs. It serves no 
justifying social objective. Rather, it puts the law enforcement 
authorities in the position of creating new crime for the sake 
of bringing charges against a person they had persuaded to 
participate in wrongdoing.6s 
Without question, as the Supreme Court has noted, a certain 
amount of "stealth and strategy are necessary weapons in the 
arsenal of the police officer,"66 and "the government may use 
62. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). 
63. The Ninth Circuit has held that generally to constitute a due process violation, 
the government must have "engineered and directed the criminal enterprise from start 
to finish." United States v. Williams, 791 F.2d 1383, 1386 (9th Cir. 1986). See Comment, 
Eutrapment De.fense, supra note 7, at 221. 
64. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 381 (1958) !Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
65. United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083, 1085 (3d Cir. 1975). 
66. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372. 
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artifice and strategem to ferret out criminal activity."67 But when 
the government is involved in the creation of crime, when police 
officers persuade reluctant individuals to complete a crime, and 
when agents are allowed to focus exclusive attention in a 
"contingent fee arrangement" on specific defendants, law 
enforcement goes beyond mere stealth and strategy and becomes 
conduct which is, simply put, shocking to the conscience. This 
conduct does and should offend the common sense of fair play 
and decency, and should be offensive to American citizens. In 
short, it is conduct which violates the due process clause. Without 
such a conclusion, our faith in the efficient, effective, and legitimate 
means of law enforcement will be eroded, and confidence in the 
government's handling of the criminal justice system will be 
destroyed. Justice Brandeis made the point so very well more 
than fifty years ago: 
Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For 
good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. 
Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a law-
breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to 
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that 
in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the 
means- to declare that the Government may commit crimes 
in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would 
bring terrible retribution. Against the pernicious doctrine 
this Court should resolutely set its face.68 
67. United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 541 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Sorrells v. 
United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932)). 
68. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
